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In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration system used in New 
Jersey with data we have systematically collected over the 18-year life of the program.  Covering 
the wages of police officers and firefighters, this system provides virtually a laboratory setting for 
the study of the evolution of strategic interaction.  Our empirical analysis provides convincing 
evidence that, left alone, the parties do not construct and present their offers as successfully as 
when they retain expert agents to assist them.  In principle, expert agents may be helpful to the 
parties for two different reasons: (a) they may move the arbitrator to favor their position 
independently of the facts, or (b) they may help eliminate inefficiencies in the conduct of strategic 
behavior.  In this paper we construct a model where the agent may influence outcomes 
independent of the facts, but where the agent may also improve the outcomes of the process by 
moderating any self-serving biases or over-confidence that may have led to impasse in the first 
instance.  Our data indicate that expert agents may well have had an important role in moderating 
self-serving biases early in the history of the system, but that the parties have slowly evolved to a 
non-cooperative equilibrium where the use of third-party agents has become nearly universal and 
where agents are used primarily to move the fact finder’s decisions. 
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I.  Introduction 
  Despite dramatic advances in the economic study of strategic behavior in bargaining, it is 
widely acknowledged that careful empirical studies of field data, designed to test these theories, 
are badly needed.
1  In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration 
system used in New Jersey with data we have systematically collected over the 18-year life of the 
program.  Covering the wages of police officers and firefighters, this system was designed by an 
economist and provides virtually a laboratory setting for the study of the evolution of strategic 
interaction.
2  It also provides us with an opportunity to characterize with publicly available data 
an arbitration system for resolving disputes.  The use of arbitration systems has grown steadily for 
the resolution of disputes involving divorce and child custody, securities regulation, international 
business disputes, and labor contracts (including the setting of major league baseball salaries), 
and the design of these systems is still in its infancy.  We use these data both to provide a stylized 
description of the basic operating characteristics of the system and to test and estimate a 
theoretical model of bargainers’ behavior and the role of third parties (who are typically lawyers) 
in that behavior. 
  Our empirical analysis provides convincing evidence that, left alone, the parties do not 
construct and present their offers as successfully as when they retain expert agents to assist them.  
Apparently, even in this relatively simple bargaining environment, the parties derive considerable 
benefits from expert assistance.  In principle, expert agents may be helpful to the parties for two 
different reasons: (a) they may move the arbitrator to favor their position independently of the 
facts, or (b) they may help eliminate inefficiencies in the conduct of strategic behavior.  In the 
former case, the parties encounter what are the equivalent of prisoners’ dilemma incentives: 
                                                           
1 See John Pencavel (1991), Alvin Roth (1991), and David Kreps (1991), Robert Gibbons (1997), and 
Colin Camerer (1997). 
2 See Richard Lester (1984).   2
despite their cost and the zero sum nature of the game, each party will have an incentive to hire an 
agent regardless of what the other party does.  In the latter case, however, the parties receive 
benefits that lead to higher quality arbitrated outcomes.
3  In this paper we construct a model that 
permits us to test and estimate the influence of the agent’s role in the arbitration process.  We do 
this in a model where the agent may influence outcomes independent of the facts, but where the 
agent may also improve the outcomes of the process by moderating any self-serving biases or 
over-confidence that may have led to the impasse in the first instance.  We thus characterize 
empirically the role of expert agents as possible moderators of self-serving biases and test for the 
presence of these efficiency-enhancing effects.
4  The unique institutional structure we study, and 
the longitudinal character of the data we use, provide a unique opportunity to study a key and 
unresolved issue in the empirical analysis of strategic behavior. 
  The data reveal a number of empirical regularities, and some puzzles also.  Final-offer 
arbitration requires the parties to make binding offers from which an arbitrator, selected in part by 
the parties, must make a choice without compromise.  First, the data indicate that employer 
victory rates, which in early periods were well below the 50 percent that was initially anticipated, 
have converged toward that rate over time.  Likewise, the difference between the parties’ offers 
has tended to decrease over time.  Concurrently, the use of third-party agents and lawyers to assist 
the parties has increased steadily over time.  Coupled with the observed higher victory rates for 
parties that retain third-party agents, this suggests that the role of third-party agents may be 
critical in the evolution of the system. 
  To capture these facts we set out a structural model in which arbitrators behave as 
statistically exchangeable random variables.
5  As in earlier work, our data provide very strong 
                                                           
3 See especially Bazerman et al (1992) and Gilson and Mnookin (1994). 
4 See Babcock and Olson (1992), Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer (1995), Babcock, 
Wang, and Loewenstein (1996), and, for a brief survey, Babcock and Loewsenstein (1997). 
5 This characterization of arbitrator behavior was first used by Farber and Katz (1979), and tested by 
Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984).  Bloom and Cavanagh (1986), Block and Steiber (1987),  Farber and 
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support for this model of arbitrator behavior, but they also support the finding that arbitrator 
behavior is altered to favor the party that is represented by an agent.  This leads us to specify a 
two-stage game in which each of the parties first decides whether to hire an agent and then 
decides a final offer.  Characterizing the parties’ offers as a forward-looking Nash equilibrium in 
expected utilities leads to the surprising prediction that the employer win rate should be 50 
percent, and that this win rate, and the difference between the parties’ offers, should not depend 
on whether the parties retain a third-party agent.   As we show in a more general model, 
deviations from these predictions permit identification of the role of expert agents in moderating 
the parties’ self-serving expectations.  The key to our ability to test for this role is the fact that the 
parties must incorporate their strategic behavior into their final offers, and the latter become a 
sufficient statistic for determining the possible efficiency-enhancing role of expert agents. 
  This model also has predictions regarding the use of third-party agents, which depends on 
the benefits and costs of their use.  When benefits are high relative to costs, as we show them to 
be, retaining an agent is a dominant strategy (that is, optimal despite the other party’s behavior) 
and the parties may face incentives to hire agents even if, in equilibrium, they do not improve 
results.  The theory predicts that when dominant strategies are optimal, the demand for the 
services of an agent by one party is independent of the demand by the other party.  This 
hypothesis is easily subject to empirical test with our data. 
  Despite some anomalies, the empirical results provide convincing evidence for many of 
these elementary game theory predictions.  First, the estimated payoff matrix for the parties 
provides strong evidence that many of the bargaining pairs do face prisoner’s dilemma incentives 
each time they bargain.  Second, the data indicate that each party’s observed demand function for 
agents is independent of the other party’s behavior, which is strong confirmation that the parties 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Bazerman (1986), and Olson, Dell’Omo, and Jarley (1992)  provide evidence on arbitrator behavior and 
selection, while Gibbons (1988) provides a more complete theoretical analysis.  A survey of the evidence 
on arbitrator behavior is provided by Ashenfelter (1987).   4
do play dominant strategies.  Third, the parties have slowly evolved to the equilibrium predicted 
by the non-cooperative behavior that prisoner’s dilemma incentives create, and the use of third-
party agents has become nearly universal.  Finally, there is considerable evidence that third-party 
agents have, at least for employers, moderated self-serving expectations, and thus increased 
employer wage offers and their win rates. 
  The paper is structured as follows: We begin with a description of our data and its 
collection.  We then set out our theoretical model and its testable implications.  Our empirical 
results are described in a sequence that begins with tests for dominant strategy play in the hiring 
of agents, continues with evidence on arbitrator behavior, and concludes with tests for the role of 
third-party agents in moderating the expectations of the parties. 
 
II.  Data 
  The history behind the development of public sector arbitration in New Jersey begins in 
1968, when public sector employees were granted the right to engage in collective bargaining, but 
strikes were forbidden.  While this restriction guaranteed a community police and fire protection, 
it also led to drawn-out negotiations that often spilled over from one budget year to the next.  To 
ensure that contracts were current, the New Jersey Fire and Police Arbitration Act was approved 
in May 1977. 
The Act specifies that police and fire department workers, and their municipal employers, 
must start the collective bargaining process at least 120 days before a contract expires.  If an 
agreement is not reached by 60 days before this date, the two parties must begin formal 
arbitration proceedings. While conventional arbitration can be invoked if both sides agree, the 
terminal procedure by law is final-offer arbitration.  In contrast to conventional arbitration, where 
the arbitrator often specifies a salary increase somewhere in between the proposals of the two 
sides, with final-offer arbitration, the arbitrator is limited to choosing either the final salary 
proposal of the municipality or the union.   5
  The Act also established the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission 
(PERC), whose function is to impartially administer the Act.  PERC assigns arbitrators to cases 
by giving each side the same list of seven arbitrators.  Each side is allowed to eliminate three of 
the names, and must rank the remaining four.  The arbitrator with the highest combined rank is 
given the job of listening to the arguments of both parties and deciding the case.  The parties 
involved in the dispute split the cost of the arbitrator, whose fee schedule is set by PERC.  Further 
details on the 1977 Act can be found in Bloom (1980). 
  In 1996, the Act was amended so that conventional arbitration became the default 
mechanism if the sides could not agree on a procedure.  In addition, arbitrator selection changed, 
so that a computer program now randomly picks a name from PERC’s approved list of 
arbitrators.  While it would be interesting to study what effect these changes have had on the use 
of arbitration and its outcomes, we have chosen to limit our study to the earlier period when the 
system was unchanged. 
  We collected data for the period 1978 to 1995, when final-offer arbitration was the 
default procedure and the parties had considerable input in choosing the arbitrator.  PERC keeps a 
copy of the legally binding docket describing the arbitration proceedings for each case.  These 
dockets typically record the final offers of the two parties, the arbitrator’s award, who attended 
the hearings, relevant dates, and summaries of the arguments.  We obtained photocopies of the 
dockets for all arbitrated disputes handled by PERC in New Jersey for our time period.  To ensure 
the quality of the data, each case was read and the data collected using a standard form 
independently by two readers.  Any discrepancies were then re-checked by a third individual to 
resolve any errors.  For this time period, we collected and entered data on 896 final-offer 
arbitration cases from arbitrators’ written dockets. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the cases resolved by final-offer arbitration in 
New Jersey from 1978 to 1995.  Approximately three-fourths of the cases involve a dispute over   6
pay raises, and a majority of the cases involve police officers.
6  The data show that arbitrators 
have typically been more likely to select the union’s offer than the employer’s offer, with 
employers winning about 40 percent of the cases submitted to arbitration.  This result is 
inconsistent with the notion that the equilibrium outcome in this dispute resolution system is a 50 
percent victory rate.  Union bargainers are far more likely to enlist the assistance of a professional 
agent to help select the arbitrator, prepare the case, and present this case to the arbitrator.  Unions 
employ third-party agents in 80 percent of the arbitration cases compared to only 60 percent for 
employers.  Agents are most often lawyers, but they can also be labor relations specialists, 
professors, accountants, or other professionals.
7 
Many variables are common to both the employer and union and are likely to affect the 
costs of obtaining representation.  One of the most important characteristics affecting the cost of 
retaining an agent is the size of the bargaining unit.  For example, for a large bargaining unit the 
monetary cost of retaining an agent on a per-person basis will be smaller than for a small 
bargaining unit.  We were able to collect information on the size of the bargaining unit for 
approximately half of the sample.  From these data we were able to confirm that the population of 
the municipality, which we collected for every bargaining unit from the 1980 U.S. Decennial 
Census, is a good proxy for the number of employees.
8  The number of years covered by the 
award likely influences the benefit of hiring an agent compared to the costs in a similar manner.  
Only one-fifth of arbitrated cases cover a one-year contract, while the majority of cases being 
arbitrated cover a two-year period.  As we shall see, these variables all affect the likelihood that 
                                                           
6 There are relatively few fire units involved in arbitration since smaller localities in New Jersey typically 
have volunteer fire departments.  The “other” category for “Type of Unit” in Table 1 refers to a small 
number of bargaining units, such as nurses or educators, who were not required to use the arbitration 
system but were permitted to utilize the system set up by PERC. 
7 The criteria we use to label someone as an agent is a representative who handled at least two arbitrated 
disputes for at least two different unions/municipalities in the period spanned by the data.  This definition 
excludes municipal staff members or full-time union lawyers who are not third-party specialists in labor 
disputes. 
8 A regression of the number of uniformed employees on the population of a municipality and its square 
has an R-squared of 0.58.  This regression does not include cases involving county or state employees.   7
an agent is retained in the way expected. 
How do agents affect the arbitration process and do the parties learn and adapt to the 
incentives of the system of final-offer arbitration over time? 
  We begin by looking at whether hiring an agent corresponds to a greater probability of 
success in arbitration.  Table 2 reveals that by employing an agent, the parties to a dispute 
increase the chance their final offer will be selected by around 22 to 30 percent.  The win rate of 
the employer is around 40 percent when neither side uses an agent, a rate that is not statistically 
significantly different from the win rate when both sides use agents.  Each side greatly increases 
the chance that their offer will be selected by hiring an agent, however, when both sides pay for 
costly agents, the probability of victory is roughly the same as when neither side hires an agent.  
If the parties to a dispute did not change their final offers when hiring agents, this table could be 
interpreted as evidence that the parties face a prisoner’s dilemma: hiring an agent pays off, but if 
both parties engage in this behavior they are not as well off as if neither party did. 
  However, the parties will generally change their final offers in response to the hiring of 
agents, since they care not just about winning but also the awarded wage increase.  Table 3 
displays the difference in the final offers of the parties as a function of agent use.  While the wage 
offers of each side will be examined in more detail below, Table 3 suggests that employer agents 
substantially moderate final offers.  The median difference in offers falls from over two 
percentage points to a little over 1.5 percentage points when the employer hires an agent. 
When final-offer arbitration began in New Jersey, employers and unions arguably had 
little information about arbitrators’ beliefs and the effect of hiring agents.  Figure 1 plots the 
pattern of agent usage by employers and unions over time.  In 1978, the first year of arbitration in 
New Jersey for police and fire employees, both sides use an agent in only 30 percent of 
arbitration cases.  By the end of our sample, however, employers and unions hire agents in 
approximately three-fourths of all cases.  The largest portion of the increase results from a smaller 
number of arbitration cases in which the union hires an agent but the employer does not.  As the   8
graph illustrates, this lopsided use of agents by the union but not the employer declines 
substantially over time.  One explanation for this pattern is that some parties (particularly 
employers) learned about the benefits of agents gradually over time.  Alternatively, employers 
may have behaved more cooperatively in the (unfulfilled) hope that this would encourage a union 
response. 
Figure 2 graphs the spread between the unions' and the employers' final offers for each 
year.  In the first six years of our data this difference varies between two and three percentage 
points, but by 1984 it drops to 1.5 percentage points.  The difference in offers gradually tapers off 
to less than one percentage point in the nineties.  The relatively wide gap in offers in the early 
years may reflect learning by the parties about how arbitrators treat more extreme final offers 
(i.e., learning about the arbitrators’ preferred award distribution).  The decreasing trend in final 
offers also roughly parallels the increasing use of agents over time, suggesting that agents may 
moderate employer and union final offers. 
  Figure 3 displays how employer victory rates over time correlate with the differential use 
of third-party representation.  The solid line plots the fraction of cases won by the employer each 
year.  The bottom time series represents the fraction of cases the employer uses an agent minus 
the fraction of cases the union uses an agent.  This difference has become much less negative over 
time, so that by the end of the sample, third-party representation rates for employers and unions 
are almost equal.  The two series track each other remarkably well.  A regression of the employer 
victory rate on the difference in agent usage rates yields a coefficient estimate of 0.47 (with an 
estimated standard error of 0.16) with an adjusted R-squared of 0.32.
9  Taken together, these 
descriptive data suggest that agents may play a crucial role in influencing outcomes and in the 
                                                           
9Adding a cubic in time as additional explanatory variables increases the adjusted R-squared to 0.56.  We 
also ran a regression of the employer win rate on a cubic in time and separate variables for the fraction of 
cases the employer uses an agent and the fraction of cases the union uses an agent.  The coefficient estimate 
for employers is 0.74 (s.e.=0.31) compared to a coefficient estimate of –0.76 (s.e.=0.25) for unions.  The 
adjusted R-squared for this regression is 0.52.   9
evolution of this arbitration system. 
 
III.  Theoretical Model 
In this section, we provide a formal model of the choices of the (a) arbitrator and the (b) 
adversarial parties in final-offer arbitration.  The sequence of final-offer arbitration is as follows: 
first, the union and employer each choose whether to hire an agent, then each side prepares their 
case and submits a final offer to the arbitrator, and finally the arbitrator chooses one of the final 
offers without compromise.  We work backwards to solve for the optimal choices to see whether 
the benefits and costs of third-party representation are structured so as to create a prisoner’s 
dilemma.  We then briefly discuss a generalization of this model that allows for the possibility 
that agents moderate parties’ divergent expectations. 
 
A.  The Arbitrator’s Decision 
At first glance, final-offer arbitration appears to be a complicated three-party game 
involving the arbitrator, employer, and union.  Fortunately, the game can be simplified into two 
stages.  Because both parties have considerable input into which arbitrator will handle their case, 
arbitrators will survive only if they are indistinguishable from each other.  Arbitrators accomplish 
this by attempting to forecast what other arbitrators would do in a similar situation.  As a result, 
arbitrators behave as though they are “statistically exchangeable” with each other, and the only 
difference between arbitrators is a forecast error.
10  Form the point of view of the parties the 
arbitrator’s decision may be thought of as a random variable. 
  Given the arbitrator’s preferred wage increase award wa, how is the arbitrator to select 
from the employer and union proposed wage increases denoted by we and wu?  A simple model 
                                                           
10 Ashenfelter (1987) surveys the empirical support for the arbitrator exchangeability hypothesis, and 
Ashenfelter, Farber, Currie, and Spiegel (1992) use this assumption in their experimental design. 
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that has been remarkably successful in several applications assumes that the arbitrator first 
decides what would be a reasonable award, and then selects whichever final offer is closest to it.
11   
Let w represent the wage from the previous contract, so that the proposed wages in dollar terms 
are (1+we)w and (1+wu)w.   The arbitrator selects the employer’s offer if 
  a u e a w w w w − ≤ −  
which, as long as wu>we, can be written as 
(1) 
2






If arbitrators are statistically exchangeable, wa may be modeled as being drawn from a 
common probability density function.  This distribution can be viewed as the distribution of 
preferred or fair wage increases for a large sample of arbitrators making a decision on the same 
case.  Figure 4 illustrates how the probability of an employer victory depends on the final offers 
of both parties.  If wa has a normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ, it follows 
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where Φ(⋅) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  This equation is a probit 
function, with argument ½(we + wu), the mean of the employer and union offers.  The constant in 
this probit function, -µ/σ , is the negative of the standardized mean of the distribution of arbitrator 
awards, while the slope, 1/σ, is the reciprocal of the standard deviation of this distribution. 
This model can readily be modified to account for the effects of legal representation.  
Suppose that agents shift the arbitrator’s distribution of preferred awards favorably for their 
                                                           
11 This model was first proposed by Farber and Katz (1979).   11
clients.
12  Suppose that by employing an agent the union can increase the mean of this distribution 
by the quantity αu, as depicted in Figure 5.  Similarly, representation for the employer is taken to 
shift the arbitrator’s award distribution to the left by the quantity αe.  With the addition of agents, 
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where Le and Lu are dummy variables equal to one if the employer and union hire an agent, 
respectively.  The coefficients on these dummy variables tell us how much the arbitrator's notion 
of a fair award is influenced by agents. 
 
B.  The Formulation of Final Offers 
  If agents increase the probability of winning an arbitration case, a simple model predicts 
the parties should use this information in formulating their final offers.  In choosing a final offer, 
each side trades off the benefit of a larger wage increase (or decrease) with the probability that 
their offer will be selected.  Expected utility as a function of the final offers and legal 
representation for the employer and union are respectively 
(3)  ] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 [( ) , , , ( w L c w U P w L c w PU L L w w EU e e u e e e u e u e + + − + + + =  
(4)  ] ) 1 [( ) 1 ( ] ) 1 [( ) , , , ( w L c w V P w L c w PV L L w w EV u u u u u e u e u e − + − + − + =  
where P is the probability that the arbitrator will choose the employer’s offer (as described in 
equation (2)), U(⋅) and V(⋅) are the employer’s and union’s utility functions, and ce and cu are the 
costs of hiring an agent for the employer and union.  The first order conditions for utility 
                                                           
12 In general, agents could potentially change the shape of the distribution as well.  The possibility that 
agents change the variance of the distribution is explored briefly in the empirical work that follows. 
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maximization with respect to we and wu are 
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We approximate the utility of the parties by constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility 
functions, with U(x)=-e
γx and V(x)=-e
-γx.  Under this assumption, the first order conditions with 
respect to we and wu are 
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Noting that  x e
x + ≈1  for small values of x, this equation implies each side wins approximately 
fifty percent of the time in equilibrium.
13 
                                                           
13 This approximation will be fairly accurate for the current application.  To see this, note that the 
expression γuw is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for the union multiplied by the old wage, or in 
other words, the coefficient of relative risk aversion.  A value of zero for γuw corresponds to risk neutrality.  
In the limiting case where both sides are risk neutral, no approximation is necessary and it can be shown 
that P equals 0.5 exactly.  A value of 2 is often used as a value for relative risk aversion in a variety of 
settings.  Since the average difference in the final offers is less than two percentage points in our dataset, 
γuw(wu-we) will be a relatively small number and the approximation will be reasonably accurate.  For 
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  Assuming P is a standard normal distribution function and substituting P=0.5 into 
equations (5) and (6) yields 
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where ϕ(0) is the normal pdf evaluated at zero.  Taking logs of both sides of these two 
expressions and simplifying, 


































Noting that  x x ≈ + ) 1 ln(  for small values of x, both of these equations yield 
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Since P=0.5, it must be the case that  0 ) 5 . 0 (
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=0.  Therefore, the average of the wage offers, ½(we+wu), equals 
µ-αeLe+αuLu in equilibrium, and we have the following expressions for the final wage offers of 
the employer and union: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
example, suppose γew=1, γuw=2, and wu-we=.02.  In this example the approximation of P=0.5 is very close 
to the true value of P=0.497.   14
(7) 
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(8) 
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α α µ + + − = u u e e u L L w . 
Note that these equilibrium final offers are now a function only of agent use and the parameters 
associated with the arbitrator’s distribution.  They do not depend on the parties’ coefficients of 
risk aversion, even when the amount of risk aversion differs for the two parties. 
 
C.  The Incentives to Hire an Agent 
When deciding whether to hire an agent, each side trades off the benefit of legal 
representation with the cost.  Benefits are captured by αe and αu, the expected shifts in the 
arbitrator’s distribution of preferred awards.  Costs, previously denoted as ce and cu, should be 
interpreted broadly and could include agent fees as well as the “ease” with which representation 
can be obtained.  To facilitate comparison to the benefits, costs are measured as the proportion 
that legal expenses are of the old wage bill (i.e., the old wage multiplied by the number of 
employees). 
In general, whether the benefits of hiring an agent are greater than the costs depends on 
what the other side does.  However, in the current model where the parties have dominant 
strategies that is not the case.  For the union, the benefit and cost of hiring an agent is independent 
of whether the employer hires an agent and visa versa.  This is a restriction that can be tested 
empirically. 
With the CARA utility functions of the model, in equilibrium the expressions for 
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Note that P=0.5 in equilibrium and that the final offers we and wu have been substituted out of the 
expressions for expected utility using equations (7) and (8). 
  Since utility functions are invariant with respect to positive affine transformations, it is 
convenient to normalize the utility functions so that 
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Since  x e
x + ≈1  for small values of x, after some algebra these expressions can be written as 
(9)  e e u u e e u e L c L L L L EU − − = α α ) , (
*  
(10)  u u u u e e u e L c L L L L EV − + − = α α ) , (
* . 
In the limiting case of risk neutrality for both parties, these expressions do not involve any 
approximations, but are exact.  It is now a simple matter to calculate optimal agent use.  As legal 
representation is a dichotomous choice for the employer and union, there are four possible cases 
to consider when calculating expected utility.  Comparisons of these values will indicate when the 
optimal strategy involves hiring an agent. 
  To better understand when prisoner’s dilemma incentives arise in the framework just 
developed, it is useful to construct the payoff matrix as a function of legal representation.  Table 4   16
displays expected utility based on equations (9) and (10).  The upper right hand corner to the 
matrix in Table 4 contains the payoffs to the employer (first entry) and the union (second entry) 
as calculated for the case where the union retains an agent and the employer does not.  The 
payoffs are expressed relative to the case where neither party retains an agent, where the payoffs 
in this latter case have been normalized to zero.  The same type of analysis easily fills in the 
remaining parts of the payoff matrix. 
  In the model, each party hires an agent if the benefits exceed the costs.  In terms of the 
payoff matrix, it is easy to see the employer hires an agent if αe-ce>0 and the union hires an agent 
if αu-cu>0.  In other words, each side chooses to hire an agent if the percentage point shift in the 
mean of the arbitrator’s preferred wage distribution exceeds the cost expressed as a percentage of 
the old wage. 
  The payoff matrix implies the union has a dominant strategy to hire an agent if αu-cu>0, 
since then it pays for the union to retain an agent regardless of what the employer does.  For 
example, if the employer does not retain an agent, the union receives an expected wage increase 
of αu-cu, which is greater than 0.  (The payoff αu-cu is called “the temptation” in the extensive 
literature on the prisoner’s dilemma.)  Likewise, if the employer retains an agent, the union is 
certainly better off doing so also since -cu>-αu.  (The quantity -αe is called the “sucker’s payoff”!)  
It is easy to see that when αe-ce>0, precisely the same reasoning applies to the employer’s 
choices.  In this case, the employer is also better off employing an agent regardless of what the 
union does. 
  The presence of dominant strategies does not ensure a prisoner’s dilemma, however.  It 
must also be the case that the payoffs when neither side hires an agent exceed the payoffs when 
both sides hire an agent.  This will be the case when αe-αu-ce<0 and αu-αe-cu<0, since both parties 
would clearly be better off if they could agree not to hire agents, even though noncooperation is 
the dominant strategy.  If the benefits to hiring an agent are symmetric (i.e., αu=αe), the payoff   17
matrix simplifies and the existence of a dominant strategy implies the prisoner’s dilemma.  With 
symmetric benefits, if the union and the employer do what is in their individual best interests they 
both retain agents and spend cu and ce, respectively.  However, the arbitration results are precisely 
the same as what would have occurred if neither union nor employer had retained costly agents.  
The private demand for legal services generated in this way is clearly socially inefficient.  This 
paper tests for prisoner’s dilemma incentives by (1) testing for the presence of dominant strategy 
play, and (2) estimating the parameters αu and αe. 
  Before proceeding, notice this setup easily explains why we might observe some 
bargaining pairs in each of the cells of Table 4.  If the costs are too expensive compared to the 
benefits some unions and employers will have dominant strategies that imply they do not retain 
agents.  For example, for a small unit with only 2 or 3 employees, the benefit of legal 
representation may not be worth the cost.  It is important to remember that not all units will find 
themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma under our setup.  Only those bargaining pairs who satisfy the 
conditions in the lower right hand corner of Table 4 face prisoner’s dilemma incentives. 
 
D.  Biased Expectations and the Moderating Effect of Agents 
  There are two immediate predictions of the model developed above: (i) the employer win 
rate should be 50 percent, independent of the use of agents, and (ii) the difference in the final 
wage offers should not vary based on legal representation.  These predictions can quickly be 
examined by referring back to Tables 2 and 3.  In contrast to the model, the data reveal that the 
employer win rate is not 50 percent but rather depends heavily on whether the parties hire agents.  
Furthermore, the difference in final offers drops by 25 percent when the employer hires an agent. 
Other studies have also found large effects due to third-party agents on the probability of   18
winning.
14  One contribution of this paper is to show that the reduced-form effects of agents 
found in these empirical studies may not be due simply to differences in risk aversion or 
prisoner’s dilemma incentives.  Our model is based on CARA utility functions with potentially 
different coefficients of risk aversion; however, even with a different class of utility functions (for 
example, CRRA), the large differential win rates and narrowing spread of final offers as a 
function of legal representation is difficult to reconcile with the rest of the model.
15  Other forces 
must also play a role in shaping the final offers or demands of the parties.   
A simple extension to the model can describe the patterns observed in Tables 2 and 3 and 
also provide a test of whether agents simply influence the arbitrator or whether they also assist the 
parties in constructing and convincing them to present more efficient offers.  In order to motivate 
the analysis it is useful to first ask why the parties to a dispute end up in arbitration in the first 
place.  Since arbitration is costly in terms of money, time, and labor-management relations, it 
would seem to be in the best interests of both parties to agree to a settlement.  One leading 
explanation for bargaining impasse is that the parties have divergent and overly optimistic 
expectations about the arbitrated outcome.
16  With such self-serving biases, negotiations are more 
likely to fail and the parties will be forced into arbitration.  One useful contribution of agents may 
be that they moderate the unrealistic expectations of their clients.  To make this analysis concrete, 
suppose the two parties have divergent beliefs about of the mean of the arbitrator’s preferred 
award distribution.  Beliefs about the means for the employer and union are 
                                                           
14 See Adler, Hensler, and Nelson (1983), Block and Stieber (1987), Mnookin et al (1990) and Wagar 
(1994). 
15 For example, consider constant relative risk aversion utility functions of the form V(x)=(x
1-λ-1)/(1-λ) 
when λ≠1 and V(x)=ln(x) when λ=1.  Simple calculations reveal that for typical values of proposed wage 
increases and agent costs, the pattern of win rates in the four boxes of Table 2 cannot be generated by any 
reasonable pair of risk aversion parameters for employers and unions.  The reason is that it is difficult to 
have agents symmetrically increase win rates for employers and unions when only one side hires an agent 
and at the same time have unions winning 60 percent of the time when neither side hires agents or both 
sides hire agents. 
16 See Babcock et al (1995), Babcock and Olson (1992), Farber and Bazerman (1989), and Farber and Katz 
(1979).  See McCall (1991) for an alternative model. 
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  e e δ µ µ − =  
  u u δ µ µ + =  
where δ  is the amount of the bias and the subscripts e and u indicate employer and union 
variables respectively. 
  If agents help their clients understand what is reasonable in a given case, they change 
beliefs so that 
  e e e e L β δ µ µ + − =  
  u u u u L β δ µ µ − + = . 
This means that there are now two potential advantages to hiring an agent.  As before, agents shift 
the distribution of the arbitrator’s preferred award (by αe or αu), but now they also provide clients 
with potentially more accurate (i.e., less biased) information about the location of the arbitrator’s 
award distribution. 
  If beliefs about the arbitrator’s award distribution are formulated in this manner, then it is 
easy to show that the equations for the final offers of the two sides become 
(7′) 




α β α δ µ − + + − + − = u u e e e e e L L w  
(8′) 




β α α δ µ + − + − + = u u u e e u u L L w . 
The probability of an employer victory is no longer necessarily 50 percent in equilibrium.  In the 
absence of agents, the party with less bias will win more often, since their wage offer will be 
closer to the arbitrator’s preferred award on average.  Moreover, agents have the potential to 
moderate final offers, and hence increase the probability their client will win the case.
17 
  It is important to recognize that even when beliefs are biased (so that  e e δ µ µ − =  and 
                                                           
17 An alternative motivation for equations (7′) and (8′) is that agents care more about winning a case than 
the wage increase, since information on win rates is more easily conveyed to prospective clients.  To 
increase the probability of winning, agents may try to convince their clients to scale back their final offers.   20
u u δ µ µ + =  differ from µ), the perceived costs and benefits to hiring an agent are the same as 
before.  Each side may have unrealistic views about the mean of the arbitrator’s preferred award 
distribution, but the perceived payoff to hiring an agent remains exactly as specified in equations 
(9) and (10).  The perceived payoffs to legal representation continue to be captured by Table 4, 
and some parties will continue to find themselves facing prisoner’s dilemma incentives.  After 
hiring an agent the actual payoff to legal representation changes, since agents moderate 
unrealistic beliefs.  This benefit becomes apparent only after the employer or union chooses to 
hire an agent. 
 
IV.  Tests for Dominant Strategies and Prisoner’s Dilemma Incentives 
In the model just developed, each party has a dominant strategy for whether to hire an 
agent since their optimal strategy does not depend on what the other party does.  Suppose the 
benefits of hiring an agent are constant, but the costs vary.  Then the probability that the employer 
and union hire agents is 
(11)  e e e e P c L = > − = = ) 0 Pr( ) 1 Pr( α  
(12)  u u u u P c L = > − = = ) 0 Pr( ) 1 Pr( α . 
This setup implies the probability that both sides hire an agent is Pr(Le=1, Lu=1) = PePu and one 
would expect the use of agents to follow the pattern predicted in Table 5.  Notice that this setup 
readily explains why one might expect to observe some player pairs in the off-diagonal boxes. 
  Table 5 suggests a simple test for whether the parties face and play dominant strategies: 
construct the two-by-two table of actual agent usage by employers and unions.  The model with 
dominant strategies predicts that all four of the outcomes may be predicted from knowledge of 
the use of agents by unions and employers, and that a chi-square test will not reject the null 
hypothesis that agent usage is independent of the other party’s choice.  This remarkably simple 
test does not require knowledge of the benefits and costs of hiring agents; rather, the researcher   21
only needs information on whether each party in a matched pair retains an agent. 
  Of course, there may be variables that affect the costs of representation that are common 
to both the union and the employer.  For example, as the size of the union increases, the cost of 
hiring an agent relative to the benefit (which accrues to all union members) will likely decrease.  
Employers are likely to face similar scale effects.  Since common cost variables affect both sides’ 
decision to hire an agent in a similar fashion, a simple chi-square test may incorrectly reject the 
existence of a dominant strategy. 
If there are variables to explain costs, then the equations describing the decision to hire an 
agent become 
(13) ) Pr( ) 1 Pr( e e e e e X L ε β α > − = =  
(14)  ) Pr( ) 1 Pr( u u u u u X L ε β α > − = =  
where Xe and Xu are observed variables that affect the employer’s and union’s costs, and εe and εu 
are the corresponding error terms. 
When there are covariates to explain costs, there is a simple extension to the chi-square 
test for dominant strategy play outlined above.  Dominant strategies imply the error terms εe and 
εu are uncorrelated after controlling for covariates.  Suppose the underlying distribution of εe and 
εu is bivariate normal, for example.  Then the appropriate test for dominant strategies is whether 
the correlation coefficient from a bivariate probit differs significantly from zero.  If so, we can 
reject the null hypothesis of dominant strategies. 
Another test for the existence of dominant strategies in the payoff matrix can be 
performed when estimating the probability of an employer victory described in equation (2).  An 
interaction term for legal representation, LeLu, could be included in this probit equation.  The 
coefficient on this interaction term should be zero if the parties have dominant strategies for legal 
representation.  This test reveals whether or not the actual incentive structure is consistent with 
dominant strategies, while the other tests reveal whether the parties’ perceptions of the incentive   22
structure imply they play dominant strategies. 
There is a third possible test for dominant strategies.  Variables that are known to affect 
the employer’s costs but not the union’s should not affect the union’s probability of hiring an 
agent and visa versa.  This can be tested by adding these employer cost variables into equation 
(14), the equation that describes the union’s probability of hiring an agent.  Of course, for the test 
to be valid, it requires strong a priori knowledge that the employer cost variables can be excluded 
from the union’s equation.  With the data we collected for this paper, we do not have any such 
variables, although there may be other examples where such variables are available. 
The model suggests how to estimate the benefits of agent usage so as to test for prisoner’s 
dilemma incentives.  The parameters αu and αe, which measure the mean shift in the arbitrator’s 
award distribution due to legal representation, are readily estimated using the probit equation (2).  
Consistency of these estimates does not depend on the specific form of the utility functions or 
how the two sides formulate their final offers.  An alternative approach estimates the parameters 
αu and αe via OLS regression of the final offer equations (7) and (8).  As opposed to the probit 
estimates, consistency of the latter estimates requires the parties have unbiased expectations 
regarding the arbitrator’s preferred award distribution and optimally respond to the presence of 
agents when formulating their final offers.  Equations (7′) and (8′) relax the model to allow for 
biased expectations.  Estimates from these alternative final offer equations can be used to 
measure the extent to which agents’ moderate unrealistic expectations. 
Note that the tests for dominant strategies and the probit estimates of the effect of agents 
on the mean of the arbitrator’s preferred award distribution are valid regardless of the equilibrium 
win rate.  Therefore, we first empirically test for dominant strategies and estimate the benefits of 
agent use as captured by the probit estimates of αe and αu.  We then explore the possibility that 
clients have unrealistic expectations and that agents moderate these beliefs.  This alternative 
model allows the win rate to differ from 50 percent, the win rate to depend on agent use, and the   23
difference in final offers to narrow with agents. 
 
V.  Empirical Results 
A.  Tests for Dominant Strategies 
Table 6 presents the cross tabulation of agent usage by employers and unions for the 
final-offer cases in New Jersey from 1978-1995.  This is the empirical analog to Table 5.  With a 
p-value of 0.16, the data fail to reject the null hypothesis that employers and unions play 
dominant strategies in the hiring of legal representation.  Of course, this test does not control for 
common attributes of the employer and union that may influence the probability of retaining an 
agent.  It also fails to control for trends in agent usage, which may be important if it takes time for 
the parties to learn about the arbitrator’s distribution or the benefits of using an agent. 
Table 7 estimates the bivariate probit described in equations (13) and (14) for whether the 
employer and union choose to employ an agent.  The table records the value and significance of 
the correlation coefficient, which should be zero under the dominant strategy hypothesis.  The 
first specification mirrors Table 6, except that a bivariate normal distribution has been imposed.  
The correlation coefficient ρ equals 0.09, although the standard error is large.  The likelihood 
ratio test for ρ=0 has an almost identical p-value compared to the test for dominant strategies in 
Table 6 (.164 versus .162).  The second specification adds in year and population dummies.  Both 
sets of dummies significantly affect the probability each side hires an agent.  Including these 
dummies cuts the correlation coefficient by a third, from 0.09 to 0.06. 
The final specification in Table 7 adds in other covariates that are likely to affect agent 
usage.  As expected, both sides are more likely to hire agents if the dispute involves a multiple-
year contract since in this case the benefit of legal representation applies to multiple years.  It also 
appears that units not involving firemen or policemen are much less likely to hire legal 
representation.  These cases involve nurses, communication and transportation workers, public   24
school teachers, and university staff.  For these workers, the sides were not required to submit 
their cases to binding arbitration, but were allowed to take advantage of the mechanism in place 
in New Jersey.  Whether or not the case involved a salary or benefit dispute does not seem to 
have a significant effect.  The addition of these controls reduces the correlation coefficient to 
essentially zero.  The likelihood ratio test that ρ=0 has a p-value of 0.9, indicating that dominant 
strategies in agent usage cannot be rejected. 
Table 8 provides additional estimates of the correlation coefficient for different subsets of 
the data.  Looking at the estimated correlation coefficient for different time periods, it appears 
that the correlation in legal representation has fallen over time.  There also seems to be a 
monotonic decline in the correlation coefficient as a function of the population of the 
municipality.  The only case where the hypothesis of independent strategies can be rejected at 
conventional levels of significance is for municipalities with less than 10,000 residents.  Since we 
collected data for cases that used conventional and consent arbitration, we also provide estimates 
of the correlation coefficient, ρ, for agent usage for these arbitration mechanisms.
18  The 
estimates from these other two arbitration systems are bigger, but due to larger standard errors, 
the null hypothesis that ρ=0 cannot be rejected.  In summary, the estimates suggest that employer 
and union demands for an agent are independent, which is consistent with dominant strategy play. 
 
B.  Estimates of the Benefits of Agents 
  The previous section presented evidence that the use of agents by employers and unions 
is independent of what the other party does.  However, the existence of dominant strategies alone 
does not guarantee prisoner’s dilemma incentives.  For the use of agents to be inefficient, it must 
also be the case that the payoffs when both sides use an agent are less that the payoffs when 
                                                           
18 Since final-offer arbitration was the default procedure, conventional and consent arbitration were 
permitted only if requested by both parties.  In consent arbitration, the arbitrator essentially makes a 
previously agreed upon contract by both sides legally binding.   25
neither side uses an agent.  In the prisoner’s dilemma, one special case where this is guaranteed 
occurs when the benefits to using an agent by the employer and union result in similar mean 
shifts in the distribution of arbitral awards.  In this section, we estimate the benefits to legal 
representation so as to better understand the payoff structure of Table 4. 
Table 9 contains the results of fitting probit functions similar to equation (2) to the actual 
decisions of arbitrators.  The first column is a probit function for an employer victory using all 
final offer cases, whereas the second column (and remaining columns) uses only final-offer cases 
for which information is available on the wage offers of the union and employer.  Specification 
(iii) adds in year and population dummies.  The results from the first three columns tell a similar 
story: the marginal effect of hiring an agent on the probability of winning is around 25 percent for 
both the employer and the union.  The fourth column adds in an interaction term for whether both 
parties hire an agent.  If the payoff structure supports dominant strategies, the coefficient on this 
variable should be zero; the actual estimated marginal effect is very small (-1.2%) and not 
significantly different from zero.  Including the interaction term has very little effect on the other 
coefficient estimates, although the standard errors on the coefficients for agent usage increase 
substantially. 
The last two specifications in Table 9 add in the average of the parties’ final offers.  The 
results indicate that when the employer hires an agent, the distribution of awards shifts upward by 
around two-thirds of a standard deviation of the distribution of arbitral awards.  Likewise, when 
the union retains an agent, the distribution of awards shifts downward by around two-thirds of a 
standard deviation.  In the bottom panel, we test whether or not these mean shifts are equal in 
magnitude for the employer and union.  In both specifications, the null hypothesis of a symmetric 
agent effect cannot be rejected. 
  Table 10 considers two alternative models for the effects of agents and final offers.  First, 
it could be the case that employers and unions hire agents to reduce the variance in outcomes for 
a given set of final offers.  The first column interacts the use of agents with the average of the   26
final offers to test for whether agents change the variance of the award distribution in addition to 
the mean.  The coefficients on these interactions indicate that hiring an agent has almost no effect 
on the variance of the award distribution.  Second, arbitrators could treat employer and union 
final offers differentially.  The second specification includes the employer and union final offers 
separately in lieu of the average of the two.  While the coefficient on the employer’s final offer is 
larger, the null hypothesis that the offers are treated symmetrically cannot be rejected.
19 
Since our panel of arbitration cases spans 18 years, our dataset contains many disputes 
decided by the same arbitrator as well as many cases represented by the same agent.  Table 11 
uses these unique aspects of the data to estimate probit models that control for individual agent 
effects and individual arbitrator effects.  The first column adds in dummy variables for the 
experienced agents, where “experienced” is defined as an agent who handled at least 35 
arbitration cases.  These agent dummies enter the probit equation significantly, with the effect of 
using an (non-experienced) agent being somewhat smaller compared to the estimates in Tables 9 
and 10.  One agent, Mr. Loccke, was especially experienced.  He represented the union in 25 
percent of all arbitration cases.  The second specification includes only the 165 final offer cases 
where the union hired Mr. Loccke.  Holding constant the legal representation of the union in this 
manner, the employer’s use of an agent has a similar effect compared to previous estimates. 
If arbitrators are not statistically exchangeable, it is possible that different arbitrators 
could be systematically pro-union or pro-employer.  The third column of estimates in Table 11 
includes dummies for the 42 arbitrators who handled at least two cases and did not always decide 
in favor of the union or employer.  These dummies are not jointly significant, and they do not 
markedly change the previous estimates of the benefits of hiring an agent.  Mr. Mitrani was the 
arbitrator in approximately 10 percent of all cases going to arbitration.  Specification (iv) uses 
                                                           
19 The gap between the employer and union final-offer coefficients drops in models similar to those 
estimated in Table 11. 
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only data from cases handled by him.  Once again, the estimated benefits of agent usage do not 
change appreciably.  The results from these two specifications suggest that the benefits of legal 
representation are not primarily due to an agent’s assistance in the selection of the arbitrator. 
In summary, the results in Tables 9 through 11 provide strong evidence that each party 
increases the chance that their offer will be accepted when they retain agents.  The benefits of 
agent use appear to be the same for both the employer and union in terms of mean shifts in the 
award distribution.  There also is no significant interaction effect when both parties hire agents on 
the arbitrator’s decision.  Given the evidence that each party has a dominant strategy and that the 
benefits of using an agent are symmetric, we conclude that prisoner’s dilemma incentives exist 
for legal representation in New Jersey final-offer arbitration. 
Is there any way to translate the shifts in the award distribution from retaining an agent 
into dollar terms?  Richard Lester helped in the design of New Jersey’s final-offer mechanism 
and followed its use over time.  For the mid-eighties, he found that legal fees are generally around 
$5,000 per case for the union, and up to $15,000 per case for the employer (Lester (1989)).  A 
permanent increase in the compensation of a police officer by 1% would have a discounted 
present value of perhaps $2,000 to $3,000 for this same time period.  It would take a bargaining 
unit of only 5 to 10 employees to make it well worth the cost for each party individually to retain 
an agent.  In short, there is little doubt that the incentive structure in New Jersey’s arbitration 
system creates a prisoner’s dilemma for the parties. 
 
C.  Measurement Error in the Observed Final Offers 
One empirical issue arises when fitting the probit function of equation (2) since the final 
wage offers of the two parties are likely to be measured with error.  When collecting the wage 
offer data, we noted that sometimes the entire unit was bargaining over a percentage wage 
increase that applied to all workers.  Other times we had to calculate final offers using a salary 
increase for a police officer with a given rank and level of experience.  In addition, while we   28
focus on wages, other non-wage benefits such as uniform allowances, sick leave, and dental 
benefits were often included in the arbitration cases.  Using wage compensation only may be a 
somewhat noisy estimate of the total value of the items under dispute. 
  Fortunately, the basic structure of the model is unaffected by classical measurement error.  
Suppose we observe noisy estimates of the actual final offers  *
e w  and  *
u w , where the noise is 
mean zero and independent of  e w ,  u w , and  a w .  Using the noisy estimates instead of the true 
values, we can rewrite equation (1) as 
(1′) 
2






≤ +  
where m is a new random variable capturing the combined measurement error in the final offers.  
Assuming m has a normal distribution with variance  2
m σ , the left hand side of (1′) is normally 
distributed with variance  2 2
m σ σ + . 
  How are the coefficient estimates affected by the presence of the type of measurement 
error described above?  In a linear model, if an explanatory variable is measured with classical 
error, the corresponding coefficient is biased towards zero.  In our probit model with 
measurement error, there is likely to be a similar attenuation bias, although it should be noted that 
the coefficient estimate could theoretically be biased up in more general cases.
20  Since the 
coefficient on the average of the final wage offers in the absence of measurement error is the 
reciprocal of σ , if this coefficient is biased towards zero, the implied estimate of σ  is upward 
biased.  Since the average of the final offers is close to orthogonal to agent use in this dataset, 
however, this bias should not markedly affect the coefficient estimates for agents in the probit 
equation.  Indeed, including the average of the final offers does not change the coefficient 
estimates appreciably (see Table 9).  It will, however, affect the scaling used to obtain the implied 
                                                           
20 See Carroll, Ruppert, and Stefanski (1995) for a general discussion of measurement error in nonlinear 
models.   29
mean shifts from using an agent. 
  If there were no measurement error, column (v) in Table 9 would imply that the standard 
deviation of the arbitrator’s award distribution is 3.19 percent.  The implied mean shifts due to the 
employer and union using an agent would be -2.25 percent and 1.91 percent, respectively.  If the 
actual value of σ  is smaller, the implied mean shifts from using an agent would also be smaller.  
This suggests that it might be simplest to express the effect of agents relative to the standard 
deviation.  Alternatively, one can look at the marginal effect of a change in agent use on the 
probability of an employer victory.  Tables 9 through 11 estimate that both union and employer 
agents shift the arbitrator’s distribution favorably for their clients by around two-thirds of a 
standard deviation, with an associated marginal effect of approximately 25 percentage points. 
 
D.  Estimates of the Moderating Effect of Agents 
As we showed earlier, it is possible to test whether expert agents moderate the self-
serving expectations of the parties and to estimate any effect they may have from the effect that 
agent usage has on the final offers of the parties.  This is a particularly important characteristic of 
the final-offer system, since the offers of the parties provide a complete summary of their 
strategic behavior.  Moreover, it is possible to estimate the moderating effect of agents even if the 
center of the arbitral distribution is not known by using a fixed-effects estimator, much in the 
manner of the fixed-effects estimator so often used to eliminate bias in the typical cross-section 
relationship.  Subtracting the final offer of the employer in equation (7′) from the final offer of 
the union in equation (8′) differences out any common observed or unobserved variables and 
yields 
(15) 
) 0 ( ϕ
σ
β β δ δ + − − + = − u u e e e u e u L L w w , 
where  βe and βu are estimates of the effect of the moderating effect on self-serving biases that 
result from agent usage for the employer and union.   30
The estimated coefficients for this differenced equation appear in Table 12.  The 
coefficient for the union’s agent usage dummy is not significantly different from zero, whereas 
the coefficient for employer’s agent usage is significantly negative.  The employer’s estimate 
implies βe equals 0.44 percent, or that agents cause employers to increase their offers by almost 
half of a percentage point on average.  This is precisely the direction that the moderating effect 
would be expected to be for an employer.  However, we do not find this effect for the union, 
suggesting that any self-serving biases may have been asymmetric in this case.
21 
  Whether half of a percentage point is a large or small effect depends partly on the 
magnitude of σ, the standard deviation of the arbitrator’s preferred award distribution.  The 
constant term in the difference regression is an estimate of 
) 0 ( ϕ
σ
δ δ + + e u .  If there were no bias 
(i.e., 0 = = e u δ δ ), then the estimated σ would be 0.83 percent.  Any bias in the parties’ beliefs 
would make this number even smaller.  A conservative estimate is that agents cause employers to 
increase their offer by one-half of a standard deviation of the award distribution, a fraction that 
increases as the sum of the bias terms grows.  Recall that the implied estimate of σ was over 3 
percent using Table 9 (ignoring measurement error).  The difference between the implied 
estimates from Tables 9 and 12 suggests that there must be a fair amount of measurement error in 
the observed final offers.  Any common measurement error is subtracted out of equation (15), but 
remains in equation (2).  Viewed in this light, the effects appearing in Table 12 are not 
necessarily small although they are imprecisely measured. 
 
                                                           
21 The least squares estimates of the effects of agent usage on the offers of the parties, apart from the effect 
on the employer’s offer of an employer’s agent, are small and poorly determined.  There are several 
explanations for this result, including the problem of omitted variables that is, of course, resolved in the 
fixed-effects estimation of equation (15). 
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E.  The Effect of Agents over Time 
  The data in Figures 1 and 2 noted earlier suggest that the parties may learn about 
arbitration and the benefits of agents as time goes on.  To better understand the evolution of the 
system and the demand for agents over time, Table 13 interacts agent use with arbitrators’ 
decisions and final offers over time.  The first column in Table 13 re-estimates the probability of 
an employer victory, allowing for agents to become more or less effective advocates over time.  
The data is divided into three periods and interacted with agent use to create six dummy variables 
for the probit of equation (2).  Although the estimates move a little, the effects of using an agent 
are fairly constant across periods.  The effects are similar to those estimated in Tables 9 through 
11 and not significantly different for the three time periods.  These results imply that the 
incentives to hire an agent do not change much over time.  They suggest that the increasing use of 
agents over time is not primarily because agents are becoming more effective at persuading 
arbitrators to rule in favor of their clients. 
  If the extent of biased expectations for the moderating effect of agents changes over time, 
then time interactions should be added to the equations to explain the final offers also.  The 
difference in final offers then parallels equation (15), where the relevant parameters are allowed 
to vary over time as parties update their beliefs.  Column (ii) in Table 13 regresses the difference 
in the final offers on dummy variables for agent use in three time periods and three period 
specific intercept terms (compare to Table 12, column (iii)).  It appears that agents moderated 
employers’ final offers substantially in the first six years of the data, but had a negligible effect in 
the last 12 years of the data.  In contrast, agents have no significant moderating effect on wages 
for unions in any of the time periods.  Perhaps employers were more biased in the early years, and 
agents helped to moderate these unrealistic beliefs.  The separate intercept terms for the three 
time periods support the notion that the parties were particularly biased in the early years of the 
data.  The intercept term, which estimates 
) 0 ( ϕ
σ
δ δ + + e u  for each time period, decreases from   32
2.5 for the first data period to 1.0 for the final data period.  If σ remained constant over time, this 
pattern implies the amount of bias ( e u δ δ + ) decreased significantly over time as the parties 
learned about the arbitrators’ average preferred wage increase. 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  Our study of the 18-year evolution of a carefully structured arbitration system suggests 
that the parties do respond, albeit slowly, to strategic incentives to alter their behavior.  First, a 
simple model of the bargaining game that separates the arbitrator’s behavior from the strategic 
interaction of the parties is consistent with the data.  Second, the evidence is strong that the 
parties face incentives to employ costly third-party agents to improve their outcomes.  In a simple 
model we show that the parties may have dominant strategies, in which case the demand for an 
agent by a party is independent of the other party’s behavior.  This implication of the model for 
the behavior of the parties is easily tested and our data are consistent with it. 
  We also show that for many of the bargaining pairs, the structure of the payoff matrix 
they face in each bargaining round is much like that in the classical prisoner’s dilemma: the 
benefits to the parties dissipate if both retain agents.  However, this does not rule out the 
possibility that agents may play a key role in moderating any self-serving expectations the parties 
may have.  To test for this possibility we construct a general model in which it is possible to 
estimate the extent to which agents play a key productive role in altering any incorrect 
expectations the parties may hold about the arbitrator’s behavior.  The data do provide empirical 
support for the hypothesis that employers who hired agents in the early periods of operation of the 
system were productively assisted and that this resulted in increased final offers and employer 
win rates.  However, there is no evidence that this role for agents persisted after the first few 
years of the system’s existence.  Instead, employers learned how to educate their expectations 
regardless of whether an agent was employed.  Of course, as with any instructional outcome, it is   33
difficult to know whether this may well be the payoff to the earlier use of expert agents.  As a 
result, it is not possible to draw any overall conclusion about the possible efficiency-enhancing 
role for expert agents. 
  As is well known (see Kreps (1991), for example), when there is repeated play the parties 
may arrive at cooperative arrangements despite the existence of a prisoner’s dilemma payoff 
matrix in each round of bargaining.  Thus, we look for evidence of the parties’ cooperation by 
studying the history of the use of agents by the parties.  When the system first began there is 
strong evidence that the parties did not always retain agents, even when they would have found it 
in their unilateral interest to do so.  The data also suggest that when agents were retained in the 
early period it was primarily by unions, who in turn enjoyed higher than predicted win rates as a 
result.  However, over the long run the data are unambiguous on one key point: they imply that 
the parties have slowly approached the point where agents are being employed nearly universally, 
despite the evidence that, when both parties employ agents, they do not influence outcomes.  In 
short, the evidence from this field study of a precisely specified arbitration system is that 
cooperative behavior that is not in the short-run interests of the parties is difficult to sustain. 
  A key question for future research is the extent to which the findings in this application 
are likely to be informative in other situations of bargaining and conflict.  One important issue is 
the extent to which there is heterogeneity in the long-run outcomes of different systems, for 
whatever reason.  The role of agents in situations of conflict has been the source of a great deal of 
recent research, and the variety of settings in which the issue arises is enormous.
22  Certainly the 
evidence from laboratory experiments, which, apart from anecdotes, comprises nearly all of what 
is generally known about the role of cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma environments, suggests 
that cooperation sometimes occurs unpredictably in some groups.
23  Despite the evidence in other 
                                                           
22 A particularly interesting example is Mnookin and Susskind (1999), which reports studies ranging from 
sports agents to diplomats. 
23 See, for example, Rapoport and Chammah (1965) and Poundstone (1992).   34
environments, far more study of the evolution of these systems over time is needed if we are to 
understand how to design systems that will encourage cooperative behavior in a wide variety of 
settings.   35
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  Vol. 101, pp. 107-114. TABLE 1.  SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION CASES IN NEW JERSEY, 1978-1995. 
 
 





Cases in Which the Union Uses an Agent  79.7 
Cases in Which the Employer Uses an Agent  59.2 
Cases with Unavailable Data on Agents  4.1 
 
Disputed Items: 
 Wages  Only  12.5 
  Non-wage Benefits Only  5.5 
  Wages and Non-wage Benefits  82.0 
 
Type of Unit: 
 Police  84.8 
 Fire      12.9 
 Other  2.2 
 
Population of Municipality: 
 population≤5,000 9.6 
 5,000<population≤10,000 15.1 
 10,000<population≤15,000 12.8 
 15,000<population≤25,000 14.4 
 25,000<population≤50,000 15.3 
 50,000<population≤100,000 8.5 
  population>100,000 (excluding county or state cases)  6.1 
 county  case  14.4 
 state  case  1.2 
 unavailable  2.6 
 
Number of Uniformed Employees:
b 
 employees≤10 16.1 
 10<employees≤25 28.7 
 25<employees≤50 26.3 
 50<employees≤100 14.5 
 employees>100  14.5 
 
Number of Years Covered by Award: 
 One    20.4 
 Two  52.6 
  Three or More  27.0 
 
Note:  Percentages calculated using 896 final-offer arbitration cases, except where noted. 
aPercentage calculated using 845 cases for which the arbitrator’s decision was available. 
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Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  814 observations.  
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Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  620 observations.  
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Note:  The first entry represents the employer’s payoff and the second entry represents the union’s payoff. 
The payoffs are written in terms of the proportionate effect on the net value added (employer) and the net 
wage bill (union). 
 
αe, αu = the shift in the mean of the distribution of arbitrator awards resulting from the use of an agent for 
the employer and union, respectively 
 
ce, cu = the cost (as a percentage of the wage bill) of using an agent for the employer and union, 
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Pe, Pu = probability the employer and union hire agents, respectively 
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Chi-square test statistic for independence of rows and columns is 1.96 (p−value=0.162). 
 
 
Notes:  859 observations. 
  




     Bivariate Probit 
 (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
  Agent Hired by:  Agent Hired by:  Agent Hired by: 
  Emp. Union  Emp. Union  Emp. Union 
 
Constant .298  .959  1.199  .955  -.731  .336 




     Two Years  ---  ---  ---  ---    .716  .201 
          (.141)  (.158) 
     Three Years or Longer  ---  ---  ---  ---    .850  .326 
          (.177)  (.206) 
     Unknown  ---  ---  ---  ---    -.252  -.270 
          (.236)  (.277) 
     One Year  ---  ---  ---  ---       ---     --- 
 [p-value for contract length]              [.000]   
 
Disputed Items 
     Salary only  ---  ---  ---  ---    -.233  -.112 
          (.140)  (.159) 
     Benefits only  ---  ---  ---  ---    .074  .681 
          (.279)  (.393) 
[p-value for salary dispute]              [.155] 
 
Type  of  Unit            
     Fire  ---  ---  ---  ---    .168  -.049 
          (.153)  (.177) 
     Other  ---  ---  ---  ---    -.646  -2.109 
          (.329)  (.396) 
     Police  ---  ---  ---  ---       ---     --- 
[p-value  for  type  of  unit]               [.000]   
 
Year Dummies Included?    NO      YES        YES 
[p-value  for  year  dummies]           [.000]      [.085] 
  
 
Population  Dummies  Included?   NO      YES     YES 
[p-value for population dummies]          [.002]        [.008]   
 
Correlation Coefficient (ρ)  .089    .060     -.009   
  (.064)    (.069)      (.073) 
Likelihood Ratio Test of ρ=0
a  1.933    .748      0.016 
[p-value for LR test]  [.164]    [.387]        [.901] 
 
Log  Likelihood  -960.7    -896.9      -855.0   
Observations   859     859        859 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
aThe likelihood ratio test has a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. 
 TABLE 8.  ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT FOR THE CHOICES OF THE PARTIES 




 Correlation    p-value  from 
 Coefficient
a  Std. Err.  LR test of ρ=0   Obs. 
 
Time Period 
     1978-1995  .089  .064  .164  859 
     1978-1985  .076  .077  .323  542   
     1986-1995  .018  .122  .884  317 
 
Type of Arbitration 
     Final Offer  .089 .063 .164 859   
     Conventional  .141 .111 .215 251 
     Consent  .176  .167  .313  101 
 
Dispute over Wages and Benefits? 
     Yes  .053 .072 .458 704 
     No  .214 .140 .137 155 
 
Type of Unit 
     Police  .096 .071 .177 728 
     Fire  -.059  .179  .741  114 
 
Population of Municipality 
     population <= 10,000  .392  .116  .002  212 
     10,000 < population <= 25,000  .094  .128  .465  232 
     25,000 < population <= 50,000  .078  .176  .657  135 
    50,000 < population <=100,000  -.074  .231  .750  74 
     population > 100,000
b  -.154  .131 .247 186   
 
aThe estimated correlation of the error terms in the two equations determining whether the employer and 
union hire an agent, without any additional covariates. 
bIncludes county and state cases. 




   (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi) 
 
Employer  Hires  an  Agent  .756 .708 .733 .760 .699 .613 
      (.098) (.112) (.123) (.282) (.128) (.293) 
      [.274] [.255] [.262] [.271] [.249] [.220] 
 
Union  Hires  an  Agent    -.667 -.637 -.562 -.543 -.597 -.659 
      (.122) (.144) (.152) (.233) (.157) (.245) 
      [-.260] [-.249] [-.219] [-.212] [-.232] [-.256] 
 
Both  Sides  Hire  Agents    --- --- --- -.032  --- .104 
      (.308)   (.319) 
      [ - . 0 1 2 ]    [ . 0 3 9 ]  
 
Average  of  Final  Offers    --- --- --- --- .311  .313 
     (.054)  (.054)
      [.116]  [.117] 
 
Year  Dummies  Included?    NO  NO  YES YES YES YES 
     p-value for Year Dummies     .491 .493 .006 .006 
 
Population Dummies Included?
a    NO  NO  YES YES YES YES 
     p-value for Population Dummies      .014  .014  .006  .006
        
Log-Likelihood    -501.5 -382.9 -363.8 -363.8 -342.5 -342.5 
Observations   814
b  620 620 620 620 620 
Agent Effect Symmetric?
c 
     p-value      .543  .684 .367 .645 .606 .926 
 
Notes:  Standard errors reported in parentheses.  The change in probability associated with a change in each 
independent variable is reported in brackets (calculated at the means of the other independent variables). 
aMunicipalities are divided into seven population groups, based on population figures from the 1970, 1980, 
and 1990 U.S. Censuses.  Cases involving counties or the state receive separate dummies. 
bSpecification (i) uses data from all final offer arbitration cases, while (ii)-(vi) use only final offer 
arbitration cases for which information is available on the wage offers of the union and employer. 
cTest of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on “employer hires an agent” and “union hires an agent” 
are equal in magnitude and opposite in sign. 





 (i)  (ii) 
 
Employer Hires an Agent  .657  .697   
 (.148)  (.129)   
 [.235]  [.248]   
 
Union Hires an Agent  -.588  -.600   
 (.170)  (.157)   
 [-.228]  [-.233]   
 
Average of Final Offers  .312     ---   
 (.054)     
 [.117]     
 
Average of Final Offers  .019     --- 
     × Employer Hires an Agent  (.031)   
 [.007] 
      
Average of Final Offers  -.001     ---   
     × Union Hires an Agent  (.033)   
 [-.000]     
 
Employer Final Offer     ---  .203   
   (.055)   
   [.076]   
 
Union Final Offer     ---  .116   
   (.048)   
   [.043]   
 
Log-Likelihood -342.2  -342.0   
Observations 620  620 
Agent Effect Symmetric?
a 
     p-value  .732  .621   
Final Offers Treated Symmetrically?
b 
     p-value    ---  .321   
Notes:  Standard errors reported in parentheses.  The change in probability associated with a change in each 
independent variable is reported in brackets (calculated at the means of the other independent variables).  
All specifications include year dummies and population dummies. 
aTest of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on “employer hires an agent” and “union hires an agent” 
are equal in magnitude and of opposite sign. 
bTest of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on “employer final offer” and “union final offer” are equal. 




 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
 
Employer Hires an Agent  .494  .936  .851  .667 
  (.141) (.615) (.148) (.392) 
  [.180] [.295] [.297] [.259] 
 
Union Hires an Agent  -.418  ---  -.671  -.757 
  (.178)   (.188) (.523) 
  [-.162]   [-.261] [-.289] 
 
Average  of  Final  Offers  .349 .249 .371 .244 
  (.059) (.131) (.064) (.119) 
  [.131] [.089] [.139] [.097] 
 
Experienced Agent Dummies?
a  YES  NO NO NO 
     p-value for Employer Agents  .000   
     p-value for Union Agents  .052     
 
Only Cases where Mr. Loccke  NO  YES  NO  NO 
     Hired by Union?
b    
 
Arbitrator Dummies?
c  NO NO YES  NO 
     p-value      .381     
 
Only Cases with Mr. Mitrani  NO  NO  NO  YES 
     as Arbitrator?
d      
  
Log-Likelihood  -322.2 -83.5  -291.2 -40.6 
Observations  620 165 569 77 
Agent Effect Symmetric?
e 
     p-value  .736  ---  .431  .854 
 
Notes:  Standard errors reported in parentheses.  The change in probability associated with a change in each 
independent variable is reported in brackets (calculated at the means of the other independent variables).  
All specifications include year dummies and population dummies.
 
aDummies for agents hired by the employer (or union) who handled at least 35 arbitration cases.  There are 
six such agents for the employer and five such agents for the union. 
bWhen hiring an agent, the union hires Mr. Loccke over twenty-five percent of the time.  This column only 
includes cases where Mr. Loccke represented the union. 
cIncludes cases handled by 42 arbitrators who handled at least two cases and did not always decide in favor 
of the union or the employer. 
dMr. Mitrani was the arbitrator in approximately ten percent of all cases going to arbitration.  This column 
only includes cases decided by Mr. Mitrani. 
eTest of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on “employer hires an agent” and “union hires an agent” 
are equal in magnitude and of opposite sign. TABLE 12.  THE MODERATING EFFECT OF AGENTS ON SELF-SERVING BIASES. 
 
 
Ordinary Least Squares 
  
                                                                  Difference between the Final Offers of the Union and Employer 
  
 
Employer Hires an Agent    -.440** 
   (.132) 
 
Union Hires an Agent    -.106 
   (.177) 
 
Constant   2.07** 
   (.178) 
 
R-squared   .019 
Observations   620 
  
Notes:  Standard errors reported in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 5% confidence level. TABLE 13.  THE EFFECT OF AGENTS OVER TIME. 
 
 
   Probit                                                 OLS 
                                                                                         (i)                                                     (ii) 
                                                                                   Probability                                       Difference in 
                                                                               Employer Wins                                     Final Offers 
 
Employer Hires an Agent Interacted with:   
     1978 ≤ Year ≤ 1983  .633  -.590 
 (.184)  (.187)   
 [.244]   
 
     1984 ≤ Year ≤ 1989  .713  .012   
 (.217)  (.217)   
 [.276]   
 
     1990 ≤ Year ≤ 1995  .848  -.011   
 (.311)  (.309)   
 [.327]   
 
Union Hires an Agent Interacted with:   
     1978 ≤ Year ≤ 1983  -.655  .076 
 (.220)  (.236)   
 [-.235]   
 
     1984 ≤ Year ≤ 1989  -.476  -.147   
 (.283)  (.306)   
 [-.169]   
 
     1990 ≤ Year ≤ 1995  -.597  .115   
 (.372)  (.405)   
 [-.204]   
 
Average of Final Offers  .312     ---   
 (.054)     
 [.117]     
 
Dummy for 1984 ≤ Year ≤ 1989     ---  -.987 
   (.387) 
 
Dummy for 1990 ≤ Year ≤ 1995     ---  -1.470 
   (.512) 
 
Constant   2.50 
   (.230) 
  
Log-Likelihood  -342.2     --- 
 
R-squared     ---  .108   
 
Observations 620  620 
 
Notes:  Standard errors reported in parentheses.  The change in probability associated with a change in each 
independent variable in column (i) is reported in brackets (calculated at the means of the other independent 














































































Difference in Final Offers*
 *Final offer of the union minus final offer of the employer.Figure 3.  Employer Victory Rate and the Differential Use of Third-Party Representation by the Employer and 
































Cases won by employer (left scale) Difference in the use of agents (right scale)*
























Shaded area represents the probability of an employer victory given the employer’s final offer, 

































When the union hires a lawyer, the distribution of the arbitrator’s preferred award shifts by the 
quantity αu so that the mean award increases from µ to µ + αu. 
  
 
  αu 
      µ  µ + αu 
f(wa) 